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ABSTRACT




There are many devices on the market to help remind patients to take their pills, but most
require observation by a caregiver to assure medication compliance. This project
demonstrates three modes to detect pill removal from a pillbox: a switch under the pills, a
reflective type photointerrupter and a transmissive "electric eye" photosensor. Each
mode exhibited blind spots or other failures to detect pill presence, but by combining
modes with complementary characteristics, the accuracy of pill detection is greatly
increased.
Two methods of caregiver notification are demonstrated: text messages
transmitted via an attached cellular phone, or the status is collected by a PC which
provides an audit trail and daily notification if no pills were taken.
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Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long Ι stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth;
Then took the other, as just as fair,
And having perhaps the better claim,
Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
Though as for that the passing there
Had worn them really about the same,
And both that morning equally lay
In leaves no step had trodden black.
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
Ι doubted if I should ever come back.
I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I —
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
-- Robert Frost
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DEFINITIONS
802.11	 IEEE standards for WiAi (long range high speed wireless networks)
802.15	 IEEE standards for PAN (Personal Area Networks:
short range, low to medium speed)
AES	 Advanced Encryption Standard
Auto ID A research consortium fostering machine-readable ID technologies
such as RFID. http://www.autoidlabs.org/ http://autoid.mit.edu/cs-
Bluetooth IEEE 802.15.1 for medium speed wireless PAN
DES	 Data Encryption Standard, deprecated and replaced by ADS
HIPAA	 the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996:
specifies privacy requirements for all those handling patient data
ΗL7 	 Health Level Fven is an ANSI (American National Standards Institute)
data exchange standard for healthcare clinical and administrative data.
http://www.h17.org/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HL7
MEMOS 	 Micro Electromechanical Systems, primarily
micro sensors fabricated as part of an integrated circuit
MOTE	 A miniature wireless sensor, soon to be grain-of-rice sized, or smaller
PAN	 Any of the IEEE 802.15 short range Personal Area Networks
RFID 	 Radio Arequency Identification
WiAi	 Any of the IEEE 802.11 Wide Area Wireless Network protocols
Zigbee	 IEEE 802.15.4 standard for low speed wireless PAN,
intended for sensor networks
xi
CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of Medication Compliance
Did you take your pill today? There are numerous pill containers trying to make it easier
to track one's medicine intake: some have a container per day, others up to four
containers a day. Some have timers, alarms and clocks and even auto-dispense the pills,
but they all require direct observation to tell if the pills were taken at all, let alone taken
at the correct time.
Figure 1.1 Pill dispensers.
Medication Compliance (diligently taking one's medicine as prescribed) is a
major concern because it is a leading cause of preventable emergency room visits and
avoidable illnesses.
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Table 1.1 Medication Error Facts, Figures and Examples
• In 1993, a total of 7391 people died due to medication errors in the United
States alone
• The cost of medication errors is estimated to be over $7 billion per year in the
United States
• The annual cost of hospital-based medication related errors is estimated to be
$2 billion in the United States
• In 1993, over a ten year period, outpatient deaths due to medication errors
increased by 2.37-fold in the United States as opposed to a 2.37-fold increase in
inpatient deaths.
• In 1926, a review of seven studies, conducted in the United States, revealed that
5.5% of hospital admissions, i.e. 1.94 million admissions, can be attributed to
drug therapy noncompliance. Their total cost to hospitals was estimated to be
around $2.5 billion.
Source: B. Dillon, Human Reliability and Error in Medical Systems, World Scientific Publishing
Company, 2003, pp. 2, 90.
1.2 Motivation
Most remote patient monitoring systems focus on chronically ill patients who require
immense attention and diligence. This research proposes a low cost system for anyone
who needs minimal assistance with their medication.
Many exciting technologies are flourishing at this time, particularly MEMOS
(Micro Electromechanical Systems), embedded processing, wireless communications
and sensor networks. When applied to the medical field, this means that more can be
observed, measured and learned about the human body using minimally intrusive
devices. It is now feasible to use a small implanted sensor for weeks, months or years
monitoring many vital signs. As new sensor technology develops, it will be possible to
continuously and simultaneously monitor hundreds of bodily functions at low cost.
2
3
Measuring and recording body functions are already used for athletic training, but
currently require large non-portable equipment. As continuous monitoring becomes
miniaturized, then medication can also evolve to a closed control loop. Instead of taking
a pill every day regardless of the body's need, it will soon be possible to administer the
medication by an embedded processor based on real-time sensor data of the body's
current state.
For example, most diabetic patients inject themselves hith insulin once a day (or
more as required), but they measure their blood glucose levels to determine the required
dosage. That's a closed loop system for the effect of the insulin is measured by the
resulting blood glucose level and the patient adjusts the subsequent dosages accordingly.
Insulin pumps [1]  are small devices that administer small doses throughout the day. The
simpler units deliver timed doses regardless of activity, requiring on the user to adjust
dose levels if desired. New units [2] now continuously measure the blood glucose level
and react accordingly without patient intervention. Such units are still rare, but
demonstrate how technology is already assisting medication compliance via automatic
delivery. The eventual goal is to create an artificial pancreas.
Until all medicine can be automatically machine administered, the patient is
responsible for self-administering the prescription.
Most current medication compliance dispensers are too simplistic (pre fill a
container a day) or too expensive, or way too ambitious and intrusive. This thesis
explores ways to assist anyone who takes medicine by monitoring if any medication was
taken within the usual time and informing someone to help them. Other solutions barely
address this problem space.
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1.3 Objective
The scope of this project is to focus on modes of detecting pills taken from the container
and the wireless infrastructure required to support such monitoring. The infrastructure is
a large problem space because of the availability of many competing technologies, the
sudden ubiquity of wireless devices such as cellular phones, the need for privacy, security
and data access control particularly hhen participating in monitored systems. The user
interface is out of this project's scope because it is already well addressed by previous
research, and because there is no need for a user interface in the minimal configurations.
Ideally, the medicine tracking device will be as easy to use as a baby-monitor: buy one at
any store and just turn it on.
This investigation further explores modular expansion to incorporate new
technologies. One such expansion allows participation in health monitoring systems with
HIPAA compliance to assure the patient's privacy while giving the freedom to live at
home with minimally intrusive observation. This is unique from other prototypes for it
empowers the patient to control their initial and recurring costs with a variety of
configurations.
This system may be expanded to record events and make them available as
needed. Avoiding expensive monitoring is preferred when feasible, although that may be
useful to integrate medical compliance into the patient's medical history. For example:
tracking total dosages and most recent dosages would be available to the physician or
EMT. That way instead of just seeing a Medic Alert tag noting that the patient is
diabetic, they can ascertain when the most recent insulin dose was administered and the
dosage. Open source, community based services are advocated because they are cost
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effective, independently verifiable and allow greater participation and control of personal
information.
Many ambitious home monitoring systems have been proposed because there are
so many variables. If too many pills are missing from the container, does it mean an
accidental overdose has occurred, or just that the container has spilled, or some
medication was moved to another container? Without direct observation or input from
the patient, wrong guesses are inevitable despite the best of intentions and myriad of
sensors.
The intention of the system is to keep people in the loop so the patient is never a




Ubicomp (Ubiquitous or Pervasive computing) is no longer science fiction.
Microcontrollers, embedded systems, system-on-chip, commodity wireless systems
(cellular phones, WAN, PAN) all give the building blocks for Fnsor Networks in the
home.
Pervasive computing is the trend towards increasingly ubiquitous (another
name for the movement is ubiquitous computing), connected computing
devices in the environment, a trend being brought about by a convergence
of advanced electronic - and particularly, wireless - technologies and the
Internet. Pervasive computing devices are not personal computers as we
tend to think of them, but very tiny - even invisible - devices, either
mobile or embedded in almost any type of object imaginable, including
cars, tools, appliances, clothing and various consumer goods - all
communicating through increasingly interconnected networks.
Among the emerging technologies expected to prevail in the pervasive
computing environment of the future are wearable computers, smart
homes and smart buildings. Pervasive computing researchers aim to
understand how to create systems that are pervasively and unobtrusively
embedded in the environment, completely connected, intuitive, effortlessly
portable, and constantly available, that are of social value
Source: Q. Jones, "Pervasive Computing CIS686 course description," 2006,
http://modiin.njit.edu/courses.html.
Much recent research focuses on applying Ubicomp principles to medication
monitoring such as a "Magic medicine Cabinet" [3], [4] that automatically tracks all the
medication inside of it (via RAID tags), to smaller scale sensors such as an RAID reader




The "Smart Badge" [6] system was an early prototype that tracked people within
an appropriately equipped building to facilitate helpful services such as finding co-
workers and for phone calls to follow them to the nearest phone (this was before personal
cellular/wireless phones were affordable and small enough to carry all the time). Fveral
at-home monitoring systems propose using similar systems to infer the patient's activities
and any changes in health. Hospitals already use RAID bracelets to accurately track
patients' locations and match patients to their medications and treatments, thus increasing
acceptance of such individual tracking. As sensors are added (blood pressure, pulse,
breathing rate, temperature, etc.) them the monitoring will more accurately report
significant changes in health status. Eventually sufficient information will be
continuously gathered to practice closed-loop control systems for medication:
administering the medication solely based on the body's needs and reactions. Advanced
pacemakers work autonomously but allow remote diagnostics [7], not to eliminate doctor
visits but to give timely information between visits.
By definition, most RFID devices are short range, but "Project Lifesaver" [2], [9]
provides watch-sized transmitters to individuals with Alzheimer's disease, autism or
other debilitating disorders, and the corresponding tracking equipment to the Sheriff's
Farch and Rescue Unit to quickly locate a participant when reported missing or lost.
The tracking range is up to several miles. Perhaps a GAPS equipped cellular phone can
supplement such tracking.
Even more ambitious home health systems seek to combine "smart homes" with
telemedicine in order to better react to the patient's needs and for more accurate
inferences of the patient's activity. Placing sensors in slippers and shoes reports if
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they're getting exercise, giving timely information while avoiding personal RAID tags
when possible (such as living alone). Such monitoring will semi-automate required
eldercare reports such as AD (activities of daily living) and actually increases privacy
with the "invisible man" model (like in the movies, the invisible man is inferred by the
objects he touches, moves and manipulates) [ 10], [11].  This illustration shows how
medicine monitoring is just one part of the system.
Figure 2.1 The Smart Home.
source: P. Ross, "Managing Care Through The Air," IEEE Spectrum, viol 41, number 12, pp. 26-31,
December 2004.
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There are many dystopian visions of a future where technology alienates and
dehumanizes people, such as the movies Metropolis, Modern Times, Minority Report and
Gattaca. Engineering has always been a human endeavor and most professional societies
(such as the IEEE, ACM, Order of the Engineer) have rules of ethics to protect society
from technological abuse. This relates to the topic because privacy and ethics must be
part of the design and implementation from the start, not retrofitted or left for later. It is
an obligation of the engineer.
2.2 Telemedicine
The Citizen Health System is a proposed monitoring system using wireless monitoring
Health delivery practices are shifting towards home care. The reasons are
the better possibilities for managing chronic care, controlling health
delivery costs, increasing quality of life and quality of health services and
the distinct possibility of predicting and thus avoiding serious
complications. For the above goals to become routine, new telemedicine
and information technology (IT) solutions need to be implemented and
integrated in the health delivery scene, and these solutions need to be
assessed through evidence-based medicine in order to provide solid proof
for their usefulness. Thus, the concept of contact or call centers has
emerged as a new and viable reality in the field of IT for health and
telemedicine. In this paper we describe a generic contact center that was
designed in the context of an AEU funded DIST for health project with
acronym Citizen Health System (CGS). Since the generic contact center is
composed by a number of modules, we shall concentrate in the modules
dealing with the communication between the patient and the contact center
using mobile telecommunications solutions, which can act as link between
the Internet and the classical computer telephony communication means.
We further elaborate on the development tools of such solutions, the
interface problems we face, and on the means to convey information from
and to the patient in an efficient and medically acceptable way. This
application proves the usefulness of wireless technology in providing
health care services all around the clock and everywhere the citizen is
located, it proves the necessity for restructuring the medical knowledge for
education delivery to the patient, and it shows the virtue of interactivity by
means of using the limited, yet useful browsing capabilities of the wireless
application protocol
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Source: N. Maglaveras, V. Koutkias, I. Chouvarda, D. Goalies, A. Avramides, D.
Adamidis, G. Lori dabs, EA. Balsas, "Home care delivery through the mobile
telecommunications platform: the Citizen Health System (CHS)_perspective,"
International Journal of Medical Informatics, Volume 68, Issue 3, pp. 99-111, Dec 18
2002.
Wireless monitoring of medication is one of the many inputs upon which such
systems will depend.
2.3 Other Medication Dispensers and Tracking
The most extensive home medicine dispenser [ 12] is about the size of a coffee-maker,
holds 60 pre-filled cups, reminds the patient with voice alarm when to take medication
and automatically calls a caregiver if medication is not taken. An unmonitored model is
the size of a dinner plate with an inner carousel that dispenses pre-filled pills. Other
variations include multi-compartment containers with reminders such as timers, alarms
and clearly marked lids.
Figure 2.2 Commercial automatic pill dispenser.
Source: pill Medication Reminders, "Monitored Automatic Pill Dispenser
MD. with Voice Alarm," http://www.epill.com/md2.htm1.
11
The Sensorial from Secure Packaging Systems, Inc. is a programmable RFID
cap with embedded sensors for temperature and integrity that fits existing containers,
enabling RFID tracking of medications.
Figure 2.3 Sensorial caps.
Source: Sensorial web site, http://www.sensorvial.com/product.html.
Intel Research Seattle [13], [14] has explored several aspects of medication
compliance such as a simplified "smart shelf" by combining a scale and RAID reader so
the amount of medication taken from the containers can be ascertained by their reduction
in weight. RAID tags were placed on the bottoms of the medicine containers to correlate
the objects being weighed with the current and previous weight. Electronic scales (such
as  those used by jewelers) are sensitive enough to sense individual pills.
Figure 2.4 Medicine monitoring pad.
Source: K. Fiskhin, M. Wang, "A Flexible, Low-Overhead Ubiquitous System for Medication Monitoring,"




RAID (Radio Arequency identification) tags are wireless transponders that transmit a pre-
programmed ID [15] thus identifying items even if they're inside other containers (unlike
barcodes that must be seen) so they're immensely popular for inventory systems and
payment systems.
Figure 3.1 RAID tags.
Simple versions such as EARS (Electronic Article Surveillance "anti-theft tags")
transmit their presence ("I am here!") to the readers by the store door even when
concealed. RABID and other wireless/contactiess systems (such as contactiess credit cards,
ΕΖ pass and other transit payment systems) are being deployed rapidly because they offer
significant advantages over existing systems such as reading many items simultaneously
even if moving rapidly (trains, motor vehicles), reading items at a distance, reduced




The pharmaceutical industry will soon be deploying RAID not just for tracking inventory
but to thwart the infiltration of counterfeit drugs and enable precise audit trails for all
products. The benefits can extend to the consumer when "smart labels" are used for the
medicine dispensed to the patient. Unlike current labels that are only human-readable
printed information, smart labels may contain significantly more data such as
• The medicine's pedigree: manufacturing facility, batch, formulation, expiration
• The doctor's name, ID, and link to the prescription
• The pharmacist's name, location, date it was dispensed
• The patient's name and ID
Unlike barcodes, the information can be entirely self-contained in the RAID tag,
requiring no external database to decode the information. This will be of great value to
caretakers, emergency medical technicians and doctors to match the patient to the
medication and to research the patient's complete medication history. Electronic
signatures and other safeguards prevent data tampering or counterfeiting.
Several electronic pedigree legislations in the USA are scheduled to take effect in
2007, mandating stronger accounting for drug sources, primarily to prevent
counterfeiting. Some pharmaceutical manufacturers have already initiated their own
incentives to protect their supply chain. RAID is the favored technology for achieving
these goals, but requires vigilance at all distribution points since counterfeit drugs are
often inserted deep in the supply chain, often with forged credentials.
15
Aigure 3.2 Pharmaceutical counterfeiting.
Source: S. Patton, "Cracks in the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain," CIO Magazine, Jan 5, 2006,
http://www.cio.com/archive/011506/pharma.html.
3.3 RFID Privacy
Privacy and security are related but separate issues. Privacy is what you keep secret and
from whom, security is how you do it. Privacy is a form of confidentiality; an agreement
or definition of how information is shared responsibly. Military information is shared on
a "need to know basis". HIPPO are legal guidelines for managing access to health
records. Security provides tools to manage the secrets, such as ways to lock the
information from casual access, and provides authentication ("I am Jeff' "prove it") to
enforce the access policies.
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Arivacy is a major concern with RAID [16] because there is no off switch or
activity indicator. The ambiguity of precisely what constitutes consent to access the tag
has led to a battle of RAID access measures and counter-measures.
RAID access control may be achieved by various methods: temporary or
permanent deactivation; temporary, permanent or conditional blocking using passive or
active devices. EAS (antitheft) tags are permanently deactivated by a deactivation
command, or by burning a fusible link. Sometimes the "AAID" sticker placed directly on
top of the EARS tag is a blocker, so the tag underneath is never really deactivated. Tags
may be temporarily deactivated with sleep and wake commands [ 17], thus allowing
beneficial home uses after the reversible deactivation during store checkout. Tags can be
permanently deactivated by a kill command, electrical attack (microwaving or strong
EMMA), or physical attack (pulling off the antenna or just pulling a tab that severs the
antenna connection). RAID equipped U.S. Aassports allows access control with shielding
in the covers so it can be read only when opened and the data is encrypted using a key
that's inside the passport [ 12]. Temporary deactivation is achieved in many ways, such
as using a shielded bag or wallet to block detection or access of any RFID devices inside.
Even ΕΖ Aass can be selectively blocked with aftermarket shielded holders. RSA blocker
tags interferes with the reader's ability to read any other tag in range by replying to all
possible ids, or a range of ids for selective jamming [19], [20]. The RAID Guardian [21],
[22] is more than just an RFID jammer, it is a location aware multifunction device that
logs all RFID activity and selectively allows access either by allowing the reader to read
the tags directly, or by acting as a proxy by emulating a tag's response. Location aware
means the RFID Guardian behaves differently depending on the situation: at home it may
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allow all access but away from the home it may block all access unless explicitly
permitted. Eventually it will be the size of a ADA or perhaps embedded into a cellular
telephone so it will be portable and convenient to use.
RFID access control such as selective blocking relates to medical compliance
because it is desirable for the medicine's RFID tags to remain active for beneficial
tracking but deny access outside of those boundaries. Such devices empower the patient
to set their own privacy policies.
3.4 RAID Security
Just as there is a wide variety of RFID device capabilities (from sending only a pre-
programmed ID to battery powered microprocessors capable of cryptographic challenge-
and-response) and sizes (from grain of rice to cigarette pack size), there is a variety of
security options. The limited radio range of the tag's transmitter is an advantage for that
limits the range a receiver may receive useful information. Most tags offer no encryption
because it is not warranted for the application. As the data is more precious, then more
measures to protect the data are warranted. When analyzing and evaluating security
systems [23], one must consider
• What assets are you trying to protect?
• What are the risks to these assets?
• How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?
• What other risks does the security solution cause?
• What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
18
When analyzing the privacy of medicines, there are several perspectives. The
"end user" patient can benefit from machine-readable containers because that allows
home devices to track the medication and assist them with following the prescription.
Since the data can be read from a distance without any consent, there are concerns that
criminals may scan people for high-value medicines to steal, or merely spy on them to
ascertain their medical conditions, thus all the recent concerns and literature concerning
tag blocking and deactivation. The primary motivator at this time is the pharmaceutical
industry itself for thwarting counterfeiting and assisting pharmacists and hospitals assure
only the proper medications are dispensed.
If one can see the pill bottle or read the label, then shielding the RFID is of little
value: the pill type and quantity is already ascertained. Encrypting sensor network
transmissions is of little value because the presence of the transmission indicates activity.
Such sanity checks show when such security is not warranted. Cost per tag is a major
obstacle to manufacturers, but is easier to justify for re-useable containers.
Eavesdropping on radio communications is now possible using readily available
commodity parts. Α RAID skimmer [24] can read tags from a distance of approximately
25 cm (50 cm is theoretically possible). The large antenna is easily hidden in a backpack
or a briefcase so it could easily get within range of people in crowded situations such as
an elevator, or merely sitting near the victim for a few seconds. This has been
successfully demonstrated for cloning a Mobil Speedpass now that the encryption has
been compromised [25].
Wardriving (traveling around with RAID detectors to locate readers, or portable
readers to locate RFID tags) has expanded from the WiFi arena to RFID [26], [27].
19
Malicious RAID tags could attack readers by overwhelming the reader with data (for a
denial-of-service attack), or by presenting malicious data (commonly called perishing)
[22] although some doubt its effectiveness due to filtering and scrutiny of RAID input
[29].
Switching price tags on store items is an old and simple method of giving yourself
a discount, assuming an inattentive cashier does not notice the discrepancy. Web sites
such as www.re-code.com demonstrate how to accomplish that by switching barcodes
with those of similar items, again assuming an inattentive cashier. That is why self-scan
checkouts have a camera over the scanner: for a human to correlate the item scanned to
the price and description. As an act of further defiance, items on the shelves may be re-
labeled or altered for others to unknowingly take the benefit or blame. If
reprogramming RAID tags are deployed in stores for individual items then it is
reasonable to speculate that similar attacks are possible by deactivating the tags, erasing
them or reprogramming with the valid EACH for other items [30]. Overconfidence in
RAID checkouts will only facilitate such success since items are not scrutinized for
matching price or description. That may lead to an escalation of store surveillance to
include electronic-warfare type countermeasures such as detectors for RAID programmer
activity in inappropriate areas or at inappropriate times.
A countermeasure to such attacks is by using protocols that only accept input
from authenticated sources. Unfortunately, some attacks use these protective measures as
an attack. For example, most blacker tags jam just a portion of a transmission so the
CRC fails and the entire transmission is discarded. Here is a quick overview of the
evolution of error detection pertaining to data communications.
Table 3.1 Data Assurance Methods
When data communications or storage systems talk of data assurance, the
emphasis is on error detection and correction. ROMP use a checksum to guard against
data corruption because bits tend to fail in the same way. Transmission errors are often
bursts, thus the need for a CRC to catch many bit changes that may occur in either
direction. Hard drives & RAM uses CC for detecting errors with greater confidence,
and recovery from many errors, trading off memory capacity for reliability
A hash (such as SHA-1 or MD5) is a one way (or trapdoor) function where it is
difficult to predict the outcome for given input. A good hash is similar to a good
encryption system: the output should be as close to random as possible and it should
exhibit an "avalanche effect" (small changes in input result in large changes in output).
The reason for the added complexity is to thwart intentional data manipulation. When
software or important files are transmitted, their hash is often sent via another channel to
affirm that the files are genuine and unaltered. The "goodness" of a hash is the inability
to find another input that yields the same output. Since the output (122 bits for MDT, 160
bits for SHA-1) is so much smaller than the input, it is possible for several inputs to
generate the same output. That is called a "collision". Cryptographic attacks search to
find inputs that create collisions but most start with carefully crafted input, not arbitrary
text, so the system is still very effective for the near future.
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A hash by itself does not prove the identity of the sender nor restrict reception to
intended recipients but it is the building block for further data assurance.
A MAC (Message Authentication Code) builds upon the hash by mathematically
combining the hash with a secret key that the sender and recipient have predetermined,
thus proving that the message was unaltered and originated from one of the key-bearers.
The problem with a MAC is that it is only useful while the shared secret is still secret,
and it does not prove who originated the message since all participants have the same
information. Any compromise of the shared secret allows an imposter to create valid
MACs for their messages and thus may impersonate a member of the secure
communications session. Since safeguarding the shared secret is a problem, MACs are
best used only during a communication session and changed during long sessions.
A digital signature combines hashes with Aublic Key (asymmetric) cryptography
by combining the hash result with the originator's private key to create the digital
signature (an operation only the sender can perform because the private key is required).
Any recipient can verify the signature by submitting the message, signature and
originator's public key to a verification "box" (usually a software module) which returns
a yes or no answer. This protects the data from alteration over a long time and may be
stored in a database to authenticate the origin of the data. Digitally signed data may
optionally be transmitted via an encrypted channel to provide further mutual
authentication, thus preventing eavesdropping or other transmitters from inserting or
replaying data. The value of a digital signature over encryption is that the data is NOT
encrypted: it is readily available. The signature does not interfere with access to the data,
it provides a way to prove that it is unaltered and the origin. Any device that generates
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data can benefit from applying a digital signature to results that are transmitted so the
record cannot be altered or repudiated.
This relates to RFD because the data stored on an RFID tag describing a drug's
origin may be electronically signed, thus preventing alteration and proving the origin of
the message. But the message and signature can be cloned and replayed unless further
precautions are used in every hop the message takes. Encrypting a channel is useless if
an intruder alters the database via another point of ingress. All these precautions must be
used together to assure no "white spots" (places where data is insufficiently protected).
Most digital communications offer parity or CRC to assure error-free data
reception, but that is insufficient to guard against malicious data alteration or insertion,
thus the need to understand and use other data safeguards in addition. If, however, the
lower link layers use encryption that provides authentication (such as IAFc), then there is
no need to duplicate that effort.
3.5 RFID With Sensors
While most RFID tags are totally self contained, some have sensors so they may transmit
their status. Fnsor networks and RFID overlap for they both provide ways to tirelessly
measure things. Batteries RAID tags may measure things if the sensor operates without
power. Smart AebblesTM [31] — [33] uses chloride sensors in small RAID tags that are
buried in roads and bridges to detect impending corrosion. FnsorTagsTM place thin heat
sensors between the space shuttle tiles for measuring if a threshold temperature was
reached during the mission. There has been speculation about placing RFID sensors
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inside meat packages to assure freshness, on refrigerated packages to warn if it was ever
improperly stored, but at this time such sensors are too expensive for mass deployment.
3.6 ZigBee and Other Sensor Networks
AutolD is the new name for machine-readable technologies — not just a list of specific
implementations, technologies or standards. Many devices that can call themselves RAID
are not limited to just the commonly implemented frequencies & protocols (in fact, many
were proprietary before the standards caught up). Some RFID devices have battery
powered microcontrollers and active sensors, thus overlapping with sensor-networks,
motes, mobile networks and other data-gathering network devices. Zigbee is a new
network protocol, similar to Bluetooth, but focused on sensor networks where slower data
speed is acceptable, long battery life is essential (since many may be inaccessible once
deployed). A full Zigbee protocol implementation allows for large networks (thousands
of nodes) in various topologies (mesh, cellular), with authentication and encryption.
Higbee is positioned to be a major wireless technology in the near future, competing or
overlapping with RFID for many applications.
CHAPTER 4
DESIGN
4.1 Multiple Pill Detection Modes
Several different modes and sensors are demonstrated to compare reliability, failure
modes and cost.
Figure 4.1 Candy dispenser prototype.
This prototype uses a motorized candy dispenser attached to a fob-style
transmitter. Operating the dispenser to release a pill also activates the transmitter. The
number of pills dispensed can be inferred by the transmission length if the button is held
down. O receiver must within range and connected to a recording device such as a
computer which is responsible for notifying a caregiver if no pills are taken for a pre-
determined interval. The receiver may monitor several such containers.
Odvantages of this method:
• Uses a small COTS (Commercial off-the-shelf) transmitter such as an AKE
(Remote Keyless Entry), modified wireless mouse, keyboard or game controller.
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Early RKEs used a simple encoding scheme with a pre-set ID, thus allowing
cloning. More recent models use rolling codes to prevent cloning, therefore
providing authentication.
• monitoring cannot be circumvented
• pill removal is reported in real time
• novelty of the dispenser may appeal to children
Disadvantages of this method:
• must preload the dispenser with pills
• not all pills may fit the dispenser
• base station must always be on to receive notifications
• status is not recorded if the dispenser is out of radio range
Figure 4.2 Pill box prototype and controller.
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The second prototype is a multi-compartment pill container where pills are sensed
by
• A sensitive switch underneath the pill compartment
• A reflective photosensor on the side of the pill compartment
• A LED shining across the pill compartment to a phototransistor (A "U" shaped
plastic is inserted into the compartment to assure that pills block the beam).
The controller's RS232 serial port is connected to a variety of devices, such as a
cellular phone (for sending EMS text messages) or a wireless modem to a central node
(usually a Aersonal Computer with interne connection for sending status via email or
email gateway to fax or cellular phone next message).
Advantages of this method:
• Works for any number of pills per chamber
• Easier to fill the container
• Stand-alone configuration is possible using a cellular phone
4.2 Why Higbee
Higbee is a new wireless standard that is similar to Bluetooth (both are AAN: Aersonal
Area Networks with range up to 10 meters) but it is designed specifically for sensor
networks, featuring long battery life, secure communications, salability (to thousands of
nodes) and many modes of collaboration among the nodes. The development hardware
and software are often free or highly discounted as venders promote the new standard.
The prototype was build using a developer's kit of hardware and software that was free
from the Freescale sponsored contest [34]. The production hardware will be inexpensive
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(even without subsidies) once mass produced. The short range is appropriate for this
application because it's being used as a "near contact". Unlike most RFID tags that are
totally self-contained (no external inputs), Zigbee is intended for integration into
embedded systems, thus the natural ability to add active or passive sensors. Higbee can
be considered an "active" or self powered RFID tag. Requiring batteries is usually
considered a drawback, but it is also advantageous for that allows for an "off switch" and
user control of the device, similar to the original Active Badge design.
Table 4.1 Zigbee Key Features
• Ratified as IEEE standard 202.1T.4, thus assuring compatibility among suppliers
• Has the potential to last as long as the shelf life of most batteries
• Multiple levels of security ensure that the network and data remain intact and
secure.
• COCA (Clear Channel Assessment) provides a mechanism for Higbee networks to
look for and avoid other wireless networks, such as Wi-Fi
• Message acknowledgement helps to ensure that the data was delivered to its
destination
• Supports Star, Mesh and Cluster Tree networks. Mesh networking can extend the
range of the network through routing, while self healing increases the reliability
of the network by re-routing a message in case of a node failure
• Supports 3 different frequency bands, providing customers the flexibility to




5.1 Prototype #1: Modified Candy Dispenser
Figure 5.1 Schematic of candy dispenser.
The candy dispenser prototype may be as simpler as 2 wires if the candy dispenser and
wireless device operate at the same voltage. If the devices are different voltages then an
external double-pole single-throw normally-open switch is required for isolation. The
receiver is attached to a Linux AC running a program that logs incoming events (see
Appendix A.2-4 for the program listings). Every day (or more often if desired) CRONE
(the clock daemon) runs a notification program on a recurring schedule to e-mail the
caregiver if no activity occurred. The email may be directly to the caregiver's email
address, or relayed to a cellular phone as a EMS (text message) if the carrier provides an
email gateway. The actual messages are programmable. The example sends the message
"Jeff missed his daily medication, please check up!" to my cellular phone if no activity is
recorded since the last time the notification program was executed.
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5.2 Prototype #2: Multimodal Pill Container
O multi-partition pill container was modified with several sensors to detect if all the pills
have been removed from any chamber. The following methods are used
• Weight via sensitive microswitch
• "electric eye" sensor through the chamber (LED and phototransistor)
• Reflective optical sensor module (detecting range 5-15 mm)
Figure 5.2 Schematic of pill container sensors.
The sensors are read by a PIC-18 microcontroller by polling all inputs every
second (see Oppendix O. Ι for the embedded "C" program, appendix b for the PICA kit
schematics and spinouts). O 9 volt battery connects to PICA module and supplies +5V to
the sensors. O cellular phone, Higbee module or other communications device attaches
to the Db9S RS232 serial port.
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The switch input is classified as "pills present" or "compartment empty" and the
analog inputs are digitized and classified as "pill present" or "compartment empty" by
pre-defined hi and low values that form a hysteresis to prevent ambiguous readings.
Only changes since the last polling are reported. Α switch on input RC2 (CAU pin 13)
selects the message format appropriate for the device attached to the RS232 serial port.
The LED on port RC3 blinks to indicate when the inputs are polled.
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Figure 5.3 Pill container stand-alone configuration.
Ottaching a cellular phone to the serial port allows independent operation, sending
text messages when pills are removed or replenished. Outhentication and time-stamping
the event is delegated to the cellular phone system (most phones record the time a text
message is received).
Figure 5.4 Pill container PON configuration.
Ottaching a wireless communications device such as a Higbee module
communicates to a base station for event logging, analysis, retention and notification.
For the prototype, a Linux PC is used with the same software as the candy dispenser for




The modular mix-and-match approach has demonstrated that affordable building blocks
can give useful information, either by working stand-alone or participating in a larger
monitoring system. The cellular phone configuration is of particular interest to people
who want to help a loved one with a moderate budget.
The prototypes are very rudimentary and lack the robustness and features required
to make them actual products. The next chapter discusses required enhancements,
particularly security and privacy aspects that must be considered before deploying any
such device.
There are many technical issues concerning telemedicine particularly because so
many systems are highly integrated. Interdisciplinary approaches are required to balance
privacy with speed and ease of use. So much research, interest and literature has recently
been produced that most of the research focused on those aspects, particularly since most
literature was very narrow in scope. The value added of this thesis is the correlation of





The candy-type dispenser would benefit from these enhancements:
• Removable tray for cleaning & easy loading.
• Trays with different sized compartments for different sized pills, caplets, etc. .
• Aositional sensor to detect how many pills were dispensed, allowing delayed
status for times when notification was not received (such as being out of range).
• Use a wireless device such a garage door opener or Remote Keyless Entry system
with strong encryption (such as Microchip's KeeLoq [3T] or Atmel's AKE [36])
to provide authentication and prevent spoofing or replay attacks.
The multi-chamber pillbox would benefit from these enhancements concerning
pill detection:
• Try other positions of the photosensors to detect pills (such as on the bottom of
the compartment), perhaps using multiple sensors per compartment.
• Use missing pulse detection to prevent ambient light interference.
• Try other sensors such as pressure, weight, capacitance to detect pill presence.
• Add tilt and motion sensors to report when it was handled (or knocked over by the
cat), and to disable pill status when the box is not level.
• Use the interrupt-upon-change feature for the digital switch inputs so the CAU can
use SLEEA mode to conserve battery power (currently it busy-loops and polls all
inputs). Similarly, enabling interrupts for the analog inputs instead of busy-loops
allows the CAU to SLEEA during peripheral activity. The prototype does not use
interrupts because such code is significantly harder to write and debug.
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When used with a cellular phone:
• Read the notification phone number from the cell phone's address book (the
phone number was hard-coded in the prototype), thus eliminating any user-
interface (number setting and modification is then a function of the cellular
phone, not the pill monitor). That preserves the "baby-monitor" model that it's an
appliance with only an one-off switch.
• Allow multiple numbers for notifying several caregivers
• Add a real time clock for timestamp events, and to allow daily notification
instead of only real-time notification when pills are removed or refilled. The
downside of this is requiring some method of setting the clock and assuring its
accuracy since the device should not have any user interface (although a clock
display may be considered useful).
• Expand the EMS (text messaging) command processing to a chat script similar to
those used to dial modems in HoneyDanBer UUCA. This requires many changes
such as converting all BO from polling to interrupt-driven with a receive buffer,
checking the responses for strings instead of a single character, error handling for
when the expected reply does not arrive, adding a watchdog timer to prevent
blocking when replies don't arrive, adding a-priori knowledge to handle different
command sets from various cellular phone manufacturers and models.
When connected to a AC via cable or wireless link:
• Use a secure communications protocol including digital signature and mutual
authentication to assure privacy and integrity of the data collected (the Higbee
protocol has such provisions, but they were not enabled for the prototype). New
technologies such as Handshake Solutions' totally asynchronous CAUs may
reduce the power requirements sufficiently so strong encryption is within the
power budget.
• If events are not logged in real time then a real time clock is required to
timestamp the events for later retrieval. Unlike the cellular phone scenario, it is
reasonable to assume a bi-directional protocol, so the AC could also set the time to
assure time synchronization of all data sensors.
• Concealed buttons for the user to selectively permit restricted activities such as
resetting the ID or firmware upgrades.
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A current attack on reprogrammable devices (wireless or not) is to reprogram the
parameters or insert malicious code. Factory default passwords are an insufficient
deterrence because most devices are never properly administered. Attacks on wireless
networks and devices are already being practiced. Even cellular phones are now
vulnerable to receiving malware. To protect the wireless devices from attack yet allow
upgrades, there must be a way for the user to grant permission for the protected action. A
simple method to indicate that consent is to push a hard-to-press button such as using a
paper-clip to press a button behind a hole, or pressing a recessed button (similar to the
buttons used to set clocks and watches).
7.2 better Sensors
The ideal sensor is one that requires no power to sense that the bottle was opened, holds
its state until read and is electrically reset. A bistable MEMOS switch would be ideal if it
could be latched externally (perhaps by a magnet similar to a reed switch), but reset
electrically after its position/status was read (unlike a hall-effect sensor which requires
power to operate and has no memory-effect). This would sense when a container cap is
opened, thus implying medication removal. A small magnet located on the container
latches the bistable MEMOS switch inside the cap during container opening or closure.
The switch is wired to an RAID chip with input pins such as the Microchip MCRF202
[37] to transmit the status and harnesses power from the reader to reset the switch for the
next event.
Magneto-restrictive devices may be useful as sensors for they retain their state
without power, their properties can be altered externally by a magnet, and reset
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electrically. Muscle or memory-metals may be used as switches if opening the container
deforms the metal in a detectable way and it can be reliably reset by the reader either
electrically or by heat. Piezoelectric cells may be useful not only for sensing container
activity but also to generate electricity to power other sensors and the microprocessor
long enough to record the activity for reading later.
Octive sensors near the medicine may gather additional information to further
qualify activity. Enfield sensors are non-contact people sensors, which may be useful for
activity monitoring and for knowing if the patient was near the medicine or even handled
it without taking any dosages. RAID readers may be useful in multi-person households to
correlate medicine removal with the RFID-tagged person in close proximity.
7.3 Aftermarket Containers
When an RABID reader is added, there are tradeoffs concerning the sensor and antenna
positions on the container.
Figure 7.1 Easy grip caps.
Many caps are large so they are easy to grip, or have child-resistant mechanisms.
There is ample space inside such caps for sensors to detect the container being opened,
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the electronics and antenna. Such caps could be made to fit existing containers so there is
no need to transfer the medication, and the original prescription label stays on the
container. These caps could also have large easy to read labels for directions. The
drawback to depending solely on the caps is coping with lost or misplaced caps, or caps
on the wrong bottles.
Alacing the sensor and electronics in the label is best done at the pharmacy since
that is where the per-patient label originates, and it assures none of the original directions
are obstructed. This requires total collaboration from manufacturer to distributor to
pharmacy to patient. That is not feasible at this time, but once implemented it will be the
most cost effective method due to the scale of economy, particularly if it is implemented
as an extension of tamper-detection. RABID in the label has greater space for the antenna
but regrettable sensors may be hard to attach or adhere to the label unless embedded into
the container.
Embedding the RAID and sensor in the body of the container itself is probably the
most expensive because it may interfere with the manufacturing process, but it allows the
antenna or single-contact on the bottom for close coupling the reader (particularly useful
for "smart shelves") and sturdier sensor placement.
7.4 Cryptographic Attacks
A problem with any small embedded device is that it is vulnerable to attack. It can be
physically attacked or influenced to fail in ways that reveal internal status (exposure to x-
rays or strong EMMA, altering the power supply, asserting strong signals). Accessing the
chip is usually thwarted by bonding the chip to the container or label in ways that causes
38
the chip's destruction if access is attempted, but reverse engineering has countermeasures
with appropriate solvents and micro-saws. Cryptographic hardware has been
successfully attacked with power and timing analysis [32] — [40], so the next generation
of embedded cryptographic chips are resistant to such attacks to conform to RAID e-
passports requirements [41], [42].
The wireless network is vulnerable in many ways such as eavesdropping and
intrusion. battery-less devices are extremely resource limited. Even with low power
microprocessors and embedded cryptographic hardware, public key encryption typically
requires additional power (thus the batteries in the EZ-Pass).
A security analysis balances the risks with the value of the data. As previously
discussed, the home user is not the primary target of attacks, and there are many
countermeasures already available. Anyone who can physically see or touch the pills can
read the label and see how many are in the container, so there's little sense in taking
extraordinary measures to thwart physical detection of the medicine.
Attacks on sensor networks may be tampering, jamming or link layer attacks.
Some of these attacks may be inadvertent (other devices using the same frequencies, a
failed sensor transmitting bad ID or data or impersonating valid devices by duplicating
their IDs) [43]. Designs that include security measures such as mutual authentication and
data assurance in the initial design will gain greater deployment and trust than those open
to such risks.
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7.5 HIPAA and Privacy Laws
Ask any medical professional about HIPAA and watch the pained expression on their
face. HIPAA compliance is a current "hot topic" because it is so far-reaching and not
well defined. The intention is to assure confidentiality of patient data. It is achieved via
stricter control and auditing of who may access the data than ever before. Overly strict
interpretations leads to situations such as emergency rooms being afraid to call patients
by name for that is disclosing their identity to everyone in the room. Pharmacists are
now more responsible for patient and prescription privacy. If such information is
encoded on the medicine's RFID, then it could be vulnerable by snooping (intentional
spying [44], or unintentional). Another danger is the longevity of the RFID tag: unless
destroyed or deactivated before disposal, the tag may retain the data indefinitely and it
cannot auto self-destruct because there is no battery or way to supply a trusted clock.
Encrypting the data, mutual authentication or other access controls would protect against
unauthorized access during the intended product lifetime and beyond.
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7.6 Integration with Pharmaceutical RFID
The CVS RAID initiative is noteworthy for their HIPAA compliance. Two stores
participated in the initial trial, tagging every dispensing bottle and customer vial. Since
the average prescription costs $TT.00, a 20 cent tag is cost effective
With 4,027 stores and 110,000 employees in 33 states, CVS/Pharmacy
Corporation fills 10.6% of all drug prescriptions in the United States.
• member of MI5's Auto-ID Center
• project Jump Start: pharmaceutical industry's first RFID trial
deployment: used on only 10 drugs, a case of 72 bottles would
have 73 tags [one per container and the case/box too, and]focuses
on: outdates (expiration), recalls, returns, damage
Q: With Jump Start you're working hard to make sure that consumers
never get an RAID tag, not even a killed one. Why the concern?
A: Because the privacy guidelines haven't been finalized, because there
hasn't been privacy education for the consumer, and because there isn't a
killable tag in our pilot, we decided to take a removable-tag approach.
There will be a little flag on every vial. We are going to tell customers
they can rip off the flag if they choose. We're going to notify the
customer in a number of different ways. There will be signs in the store.
There will be a little monograph in the bag. And there will be a label on
the tag. That's for the trial. When we go into production, the RFID tag
will be applied under the prescription label, and we'll use a kill command
- we will kill the tag before it is placed in the customer's hands.
Source: S. Garfinkel, J. DeAlmo, S. Leng, P. McAfee and J. Paddington, "RFID in the
pharmacy: QUA with CVS." in RFID Applications, Security and Privacy, S. Garfinkel,
B. Rosenberg, Ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Addison Wesley, 2006, pp. 208-209.
Once RAID enabled home-monitoring systems are common, customers ought to
have the choice to keep the RABID tag enabled. Mail order pharmacies ought to keep the
RAID tag enabled for the recipient to verify the prescription even if not yet integrated to
the medicine compliance system.
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7.7 Closing The Loop
Detecting if pills were removed from the container is no guarantee that the medicine was
actually ingested. If many pills are missing, was it an overdose, an accidental spill, or
were some transferred to an unmonitored container?
Most prescriptions are based on statistics, not the patient's daily needs or
reactions. Applying control theory to medication requires constant measuring and
monitoring the body's reactions and functions, adjusting the medication dosage, noting
the body's reaction and repeating. Such a system would automatically detect side effects,
interactions with other medications (or substances such as alcohol, tobacco), and detect
changes in health.
In some circumstances, patients may be legally required to adhere to a medication
schedule. Clever patients may intentionally circumvent a simple monitoring system if
they don't want to comply with their medications. That warrants stricter observation
such as more frequent supervision supplemented by implanted tamper-resistant sensors to
assure the medicine was administered in sufficient strength to be effective and is not
rendered ineffective by other substances.
The "smart pillbox" can participate in such a system. If the bio-sensors report
that no dosage is required today, then the patient is notified that no pills should be taken
and ANY medicine taken from the pillbox is reported as an error. If the dosage is
increased based on activity, then the number of pills the dispenser reports as removed
ought to match. So even in a closed loop system, this pill sensor is useful for reporting
when medicine was dispensed: how much, when, qty left. Integrating RFID would show
expiry, spoilage (ex: insulin too hot) and help automate medicine compliance.
APPENDIX A
PROGRAM LISTINGS
Appendix A.1 is the embedded "C" language program programmed into the flash
memory of a PICA 12f252 microcontroller. It monitors a pillbox using various sensors to
detect pill removal, and either transmits plain text message for change of status, or sends
the message to a cellular phone attached to the RS232 serial port using the EMS protocol.
The following Linux program and configuration files monitor and report activity from
either the candy dispenser or pillbox prototypes:
• Appendix Α.2 is the program that receives the wireless status and logs the event
into a file.
• Appendix Α.3 is the crone configuration file that runs a program to notify the
caregiver. Notification may be daily or more often, as desired.
• Appendix Α.4 is the daily status program that notifies the caregiver via email or
text message.
The Linux software can be modified to operate under Windows using Cygwin or other
POSIT environments.
42
A.1 Source Code: Pill Sensors
/*
* Source code to read pill container sensors




* The Microchip C18 "C" complier and libraries
* hardware:
* The APP-Ill GΡMΡU28 PICA development board by
*ABC Electronics contains
* - 18f252 single chip microcontroller featuring
* . on chip 5 channel A/C (multiplexed input)
* . other pins may be programmed as
* digital input or output
* . on chip QUART
* . on chip FLASH, EPROM and RAM
* - 20MHz resonator
* - RS232 level shifter and DB9S connector
* - 5v regulator powered by a 9v battery
* - 11 pin edge connector for interfacing to devices




* +-- 18f252 chip
* Ι 	 +-- card edge
* I 	 1
* 2 1θ ΑΝθ 	 : analog input θ from pill 1
* reflective photosensor module
* 3 	 9 ΑΝΟΙ 	 : analog input 1 from pill 2 photosensor
* 12 	 3 RC1 	 : digital input: pill 3 compartment switch
* 13 	 2 RC2	 : digital input: mode select
* (verbose / EMS)
* 14 	 - RC3 	 : onboard LED
* 17 	 - RC6/ΤΧ: quart transmit to DB9 pin 2
* via rs232 level shifter
* 18 	 - RC7/RΧ: quart receive to DB9S pin 2
* via rs232 level shifer
*
* Setting card pin 2 HIGH sets SMS_FORMAT
* so the cellular phone on the RS232 serial port
* sends text messages (SMS) to the
* pre-programmed phone number.
* Setting card pin 2 LOB sends plain text messages
* to the Higbee wireless adapter (or direct connect cable)
* on the RS232 port to a home PC to log the events




#include <de lays .h>
#include usart.h>
#include adc.h> // analog input definitions
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extern union USART USART Status;







coast into MODE MSG = 6;
#define EMS FORMAT PORTCbits.RC2 // input RC2 chooses EMS or verbose
output
// analog input is 1θ bits, so the range is θ-1θ25
coast into ANALOGOHIGH = 22θ; // define a hysteresis for unambiguous
readings
coast into ANALOGOLOB = 2θθ;
coast into ANALOGOHIGH = 22θ;
coast into ANALOGl LOB = 2θθ;
rom coast char * rom coast full message []
"pill removed from compartment 1\r\n",
"compartment 1 REFILLED\r\n",
"pill removed from compartment 2\r\n",
"compartment 2 REFILLED\r\n",





// the cellular phone command to send a EMS text message
// including the length field








// The same messages from "full_message" in DU compressed format
// as required by cellular phones without plain text EMS support.
rom coast char * rom coast sms_msg []
// pill removed from compartment 1
"θθθ1θθθΒ81918θ331312F2θθθθ1FFθ529ΒθD9297DB6F7B99θC52CΒDF6DDθF8DD8687E3
F476D94D07C500\032\r",




// pill removed from compartment 2
"000100θB819180331312F200001FFθ349BθD9297DB6F7B99θC32CbDF6DDOF8DD8687E3
F476D94D070900\032\r",
// compartment 2 REFILLED
"0001000B819180551512F2000016E3771B1E96D3DB65371D2403498BC62493592402\0
32\r",
// pill removed from compartment 3
"0001000B819180331512F200001FFθ349BθD9297DB6F7b99θC32CBDF6DDOF8DD8687E3
F476D94D07CD00\032\r",








// Cellular phones use a Hayes-modem "AT" command set.
// This handles one command at a time
// by transmitting the command and reading back the reply.
void do_cmd (coast char * coast command, coast char rpy_char)
{





if (USART Status.FRAME ERROR) // clear any rev errors
{
// printf("Error: FRAME ERROR\r\n");
USART Status. FRAME ERROR;
1
// The serial receiver can overrun if data is received
// when not actively polling since it's not
// interrupt driven.
// RCSTA (the Receive Status & Control Register)
// is explained on Ng 167 of the 18f232 data sheet.
if (USART Status.OVERRUN ERROR ΙΙ RCSTAbits.OERR)
{
// printf("error: OVERRUN ERROR\r\n");
USART Status.OVERRUNERROR=O;
RCSTAbits.CREN=O; // clear the overflow error
RCSTAbits.CREN=1; // to allow further data reception
1
putrsUSART (command); // transmit the command string
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do // read (and discard) the reply until the terminating character
{
while (!DatandyUSARΤ()) // wait for character available
if (USART Status.FRAME ERROR) // clear any rev errors
USART_Status. FRAME ERROR;
if (USART Status.OVERRUN ERROR ΙΙ RCSTAbits.OERR)
{
USART Status .OVERRUN ERROR=0;
RCSΤΑbits.CRΕΝ=θ; // clear the overflow error
RCSTAbits.CREN=1; // to allow further data reception
}
} while (getcUSART() != rpy_char);
}
// Send the command sequence for a cellular phone to send a text
message (SMS)
// given a pre-formated message in DU compressed format.
void putSMS (coast into msgIndex)
{
do_cmd ("\rATEO\r", 'K'); 	 // command echo OFF, wait for "OK"
do_cmd ("AT+CMEE=1\r", 'K'); // set numeric error codes
do_cmd ("AT+CMGF=O\r", 'K'); // set compressed DU message format
docmd (sms_msg [msgIndex], '>'); // send SMS command, wait for
prompt






// into i = θ; // debug only
into sensor0, sensor; // the analog inputs
// Save the previous pill compartment states to report only changes
// Set initial status to EMPTY
// so all filled compartments are reported on power on.
into pill2_status = PILL3REMOVED;
into pill2_status = PILL3REMOVED;
into pill 3 status = PILL REMOVED;
into new status;
// set quart to 9600 sync
OpenUSART (
USART _ASYNCH_MODE & USART EIGHT BIT & USART TX TNT OFF &
USART EX ANT OFF & USART BERGH HIGH, 129);
// open 2 analog channels
OpenADC (ADS FOSS 32 & ADS RIGHT JUST & ADS8ΑΝΑOREF,
ADS CHOB & ADS Hl & ADS ΡΙΝΤ OFF);




DelaylOKTCYx(θ); // spin-loop delay one second
PORTCbits.RC3 	 1; // toggle onboard LED
// Read all sensor status at the same time to assure coherency
// particularly since transmitting EMS may take several seconds.
// Read analog channel 0 for photo sensor
SetShanADS (ADC CHOP);
DelaylOTSYx (10); 	 // Delay for select channel
SonvertADS (); 	 // Start conversion
while (BusyADS()); 	 // Bait for completion
sensorO = ReadADS(); // Read result
// read analog channel 1 for photo sensor
SetChanADS (ADC SHE);
DelaylOTSYx (10); 	 // Delay for select channel
SonvertADS (); 	 // Start conversion
while (busyADS()); 	 // Bait for completion
sensorl = ReadADC(); // Read result
#if 0 // debugging
if (!EMS FORMAT)
print ("%d (%d %d %#x) mode%S",
i++,
sensor0, sensorl, PORTSbits.RSl,
fulOmessage [MODE MSG + EMS FORMAT]);
#endif




new status = PILL REMOVED;





put verbose message (new_status);
pill 3 status = new_status; // save the status for next loop
}
// process previously read analog input 0




if (sensorO < ANALOGOLOB)
new status = PILL REMOVED;
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else
new_status = pilOOstatus; // use previous status
}






put verbose message (new_status);
pill_Ostatus = new_status; // save the status for next loop
}
// process previously read analog input 1




if (sensorl < ANALOGOLOB)
new_status = PILL3REMOVED;
else
new_status = pill 2 status; // use previous status
}






put verbose message (new_status);




Α.2 Source Code: Wireless Status Reception
# log_event.sh
# this shell script is invoked every time




Α.3 Crontab Configuration File
# This is the crontab file that runs the
# notification program every day.
# the command
crontab crontab file
# needs to be run only ONCE
# to start the recurring execution
# This file is expected to be edited as needed with
# - times for notification [the crontab schedule line]
# - email of the caregivers) [MAILED variable]
# - message to be delivered 	 [MSG variable]
# mail the warning to Jeff's cellular phone
# via the Singular EMS gateway
ΜAILED=9085551212@mmode.com
# use /bin/sh to run commands,
# no matter what /etc/passwd says
SHELL=/bin/sh
# the key fob's activities are logged here
LOGEILE=$ HOME /medicine, log
TIMESTAMP EILE=$ΗOΜΕ/pill notify timestamp
JOB2RUN=$ΗΟΜΕ/bin/daily lob.sh
# check medication status every day at 8:02 PM
MSG='Jeff missed his daily medication, please check up!'
2 20 * * * $JΟΒ2RUΝ » $HOME/tmp/cron out 2>&1
# check medication status at noon and 8:00 PM
# sending different messages
# 0 12 * * * $JΟΒ2RUΝ MSG='Jeff missed his NOON pill'
» $HOME/tmp/cron out 2>&1
# 0 20 * * * $JOB2RUN MSG='Jeff missed his NIGHT pill'
» $HOME/tmp/cron out 2>&1
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A.4 Source Code: Daily Status
# daily_job.sh
# Send an email to the caregiver
# if no pills were taken since last time this was executed.
# This is invoked automatically every day as needed.
if [ ! -e $LOGFILE ]
then
echo 'logfile initialized by $0' > $LOGFILE
exit 1
fi
# Send notification if no pill activity was logged
# since the last time this was run.
if [ $LOGFILE -Dot $TIMESTAMP FILE ]
then
echo $MSG Ι mail $BAILED
fi
# Remember when this was run




The Microchip PICA 1212T2 microcontroller module is sold as a kit by the Al Williams
Company. "APP-III" refers to the 1212T2 microcontroller pre-programmed with a boot
loader in memory locations 0000-01 FF for loading programs into the Flash Rom via the
RS232 port without any other equipment. "GPMPU28" refers to the PCB board which is
sold with or without parts. It was chosen because it is a totally self contained unit with
power supply, oscillator, RS232 port and edge connector for easy breadboarding. Most
of the microcontroller pins are programmable as input or output. In this application, all
the card edge connections are inputs with RAO-1 programmed as analog inputs (internally
multiplexed to a single 10-bit analog to digital converter).
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